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Life-cycle effects of social security in an open economy: A
theoretical and empirical survey 
Abstract
ENGLISH: Conventional wisdom views demographic change as a set of exogenous shocks impinging
on social security, with the economy treated as a closed system. This contribution argues that
demographics is nothing but the aggregate of individual decisions, which are influenced by social
security. This claim is supported by both theoretical argument and empirical evidence with regard to
decisions over the life cycle, ranging from educational effort, marriage, number of children, divorce,
retirement, and effort to extend one's life. Distinguishing the effects of contributions and benefits of
social security, these feedback relationships are shown to in the main hamper employment and growth,
thus undermining the financial viability of today's social security schemes, with increasing openness of
the economy (`globalization') exacerbating problems.
DEUTSCH: Demographischer Wandel wird üblicherweise als ein exogener Schock auf die
Sozialversicherung einer geschlossenen Volkswirtschaft aufgefasst. Der vorliegende Aufsatz wählt
demgegenüber eine andere Sichtweise: Er fasst demographische Entwicklung als Ergebnis individueller
Optimierungsentscheidungen auf, die von der Sozialversicherung einer Volkswirtschaft beeinflusst
werden. Diese Behauptung wird durch theoretische und empirische Evidenz bezüglich des gesamten
Lebenszyklus bestätigt - von der Ausbildung, über die Heirat, die Anzahl der Kinder, eine mögliche
Scheidung, den Übergang in den Ruhestand und schliesslich den Versuch, ein langes Leben zu
erreichen. Dabei wird durchweg zwischen den Beiträgen und den Leistungen unterschieden und gezeigt,
wie diese beiden Aspekte der Sozialversicherung Beschäftigung und Wachstum beeinträchtigen können.
Diese Effekte gefährden das Gleichgewicht der heutigen Sozialversicherung, wobei die Globalisierung
die Gefährdung noch erhöht.
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ABSTRACT 
Conventional wisdom views demographic change as a set of exogenous shocks impinging 
on social security, with the economy treated as a closed system. This contribution argues 
that demographics is nothing but the aggregate of individual decisions, which are 
influenced by social security. This claim is supported by both theoretical argument and 
empirical evidence with regard to decisions over the life cycle, ranging from educational 
effort, marriage, number of children, divorce, retirement, and effort to extend one’s life. 
Distinguishing the effects of contributions and benefits of social security, these feedback 
relationships are shown to in the main hamper employment and growth, thus  
undermining the financial viability of today’s social security schemes, with increasing 
openness of the economy (‘globalization’)  exacerbating problems. 
 
KURZDARSTELLUNG 
Demographischer Wandel wird üblicherweise als ein exogener Schock auf die 
Sozialversicherung einer geschlossenen Volkswirtschaft aufgefasst. Der vorliegende 
Aufsatz wählt demgegenüber eine andere Sichtweise: Er fasst demographische 
Entwicklung als Ergebnis individueller Optimierungsentscheidungen auf, die von der 
Sozialversicherung einer Volkswirtschaft beeinflusst werden. Diese Behauptung wird 
durch theoretische und empirische Evidenz bezüglich des gesamten Lebenszyklus 
bestätigt – von der Ausbildung, über die Heirat, die Anzahl der Kinder, eine mögliche 
Scheidung, den Übergang in den Ruhestand und schliesslich den Versuch, ein langes 
Leben zu erreichen. Dabei wird durchweg zwischen den Beiträgen und den Leistungen 
unterschieden und gezeigt, wie diese beiden Aspekte der Sozialversicherung Beschäfti-
gung und Wachstum beeinträchtigen können. Diese Effekte gefährden das Gleichgewicht 
der heutigen Sozialversicherung, wobei die Globalisierung die Gefährdung noch erhöht.   
 
Keywords: Demography, Social Security, Globalization, Economics of education, 
Economics of the family, Health Economics 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The conventional view of the relationship between demographic and social security 
(alternatively, the term social insurance will be used) is that exogenous demographic 
change has impacts both on the financing and the benefits side of social security. Usually, 
the economy is treated as a closed system, abstracting from both trade flows and 
migration of factors of production. If taken into account, these flows tend to be subsumed 
under ‘effects of globalization’, which often serve as a scapegoat for the future problems 
several social security systems are facing. 
This contribution purports to propose a radically different view, which however is firmly 
rooted in economic theory. It recognizes the fact that demographic change is nothing but 
the aggregate of decisions made by individuals in the course of their life cycle. For 
example, the low share of young individuals in a population can ultimately be traced to 
the decision of potential parents not to have children or of actual parents to refrain from 
having additional children. As will be argued below, this (and other such decisions) may 
be influenced by social security. Therefore, the vantage point of analysis will be turned 
around, with emphasis placed on the impact social insurance has on individual decisions, 
which in the aggregate manifest themselves as demographic change. 
The following methodology will be adopted. Throughout, the argument will be couched 
in terms of a marginal change (i.e. a moderate expansion or curtailment of social security) 
rather than in terms of two worlds, one with and the other without social security. While 
comparing two entirely different worlds would provide for sharp contrasts and crisp 
hypotheses, empirical evidence comes from the analysis of marginal changes of existing 
systems. In addition, the financing side is always distinguished from the benefits side. For 
example, an increase of contributions levied by a scheme for the provision for old age 
(OA) may occur without any adjustment of claims to future benefits, or benefits may be 
curtailed without a decrease in contributions. For example, in 2003 the Swiss federal 
government lowered the multiplier used for translating contributions into claims against 
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the public pension system by decree in an attempt at staving off a deficit. Measures of 
this type cause the taxation element inherent in social security in the interest of 
redistribution to be enhanced, since current beneficiaries continue to obtain benefits in 
excess of the present value of their contributions (Breuer, 1999).  
In some systems (such as Germany and Switzerland), however, additional contributions 
paid do result in additional claims against the public OA scheme, at least in principle. For 
simplicity, this link will be neglected in the analysis, also because it does not exist in 
social health insurance (HI) and long-term care insurance (LCI), the two other branches 
of social security that presumably have a connection to decisions with demographic 
implications [other branches such as unemployment insurance and family allowances are 
neglected either because their connection to the decisions analyzed here is too weak or 
because they are less important financially, cf. OECD (1996)].  
Finally, the analysis will follow an individual over a stylized life cycle characterized by 
an educational phase, marriage, and creation of a family, possible divorce, retirement, and 
death. This means that certain aspects of work life (such as the length of the work week 
and duration of unemployment) are disregarded. However, decisions concerning 
migration are taken into account where appropriate.  
2. EDUCATIONAL EFFORT AND SOCIAL INSURANCE  
2.1. Financing of social security and educational effort 
This section expounds the impact increasing contributions to HI, OA and LCI may have 
on schooling. From an economic perspective, contributions to HI and LCI are roughly 
comparable to a tax on labor income. As always, such a tax has a substitution and an 
income effect. It makes leisure as the alternative to labor income less costly, causing it to 
be demanded in greater quantity, to the detriment of work (substitution effect). However, 
the reduction in disposable income occasioned by social security contributions may be 
important enough to cause individuals with a low labor income to work more rather than 
less (income effect). These two impacts on lifetime labor supply will be addressed again 
in a separate section. For the majority of workers in industrial countries, the income 
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effect is unlikely to dominate, resulting in a positive wage elasticity of labor supply. 
Indeed, a recent German study incorporating life cycle effects finds a wage elasticity of 
labor supply of 0.6 for women and 0.8 for men (Fenge et al., 2002). Conversely, higher 
contributions to social security are thus predicted to discourage labor supply. 
An expansion of social security therefore is expected to result in a permanent decrease of 
expected labor income over the life cycle. This has an impact on educational effort as 
soon as young decision makers consider education not only a cultural enrichment but also 
an investment. Expected future returns from additional educational effort therefore will 
be lower, causing some of possible investment on schooling not to occur. One would 
therefore expect an expansion of social security in the case of HI and LCI to have a 
negative effect on educational investment. This impact may be mitigated to some extent 
if vocational training (where usually contributions to social security must be paid) is 
substituted by university studies (where contributions usually are waived). 
Table 1. Predicted effects of social security’s financing on educational effort 
 OA HI LCI 
Education – – – 
 
In the case of OA, the precise nature of the link between contributions and future benefits 
is decisive (see e.g. Lau and Poutvaara, 2006). Köthenbürger and Poutvaara (2006) model 
a closed economy in which reducing social security contributions encourages investment 
in human capital. A similar result was obtained by Echevarria and Iza (2006), 
complemented by a simulation using different parameter values. However,  contributions 
may give rise to claims more than proportionally (as is typical of buildup phases). During 
this time OA may even serve to increase the rate of return on educational investment and 
therefore induce additional educational effort. Indeed, such an effect was found by Flam 
and Risa (1995) in their empirical study. All effects are summarized in Table 1.  
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Turning to the role of increased globalization and economic openness, social security 
may induce migration of the labor force. As long as there are differences between 
countries in terms of contribution rates to OA (compared to benefits), workers may seek 
to earn their incomes in a country offering them a more favorable benefit-contribution 
ratio than their home country. Therefore, social insurance in the (less expensive) foreign 
country may achieve a surplus from migration, while social insurance in the (expensive) 
home country risks to end up in deficit. However, it was impossible to find empirical 
evidence of migration of workers induced by social security arbitrage.  
2.2. Social security benefits and educational effort 
With regard to HI, increased benefits should have an enhancing effect on educational 
effort. For HI secures access to medical care designed to maintain health status at a level 
that enables the young to pursue an education at all. Moreover, it reduces the risk of a 
future health loss that (due to lack of medical care) is so grave as to result in a partial or 
full loss of labor income, an effect that is of particular value to highly educated 
individuals.  
In most industrial countries, OA benefits guarantee a minimum retirement income 
regardless of educational effort. In this way, OA causes a reduction of the marginal return 
to investing into education. However, this impact should be of minor importance at the 
time of deciding about education since rational individuals will discount benefits of OA 
heavily as they occur much later (see Table 2). In fact, there is some evidence that the 
subjective rate of discount is between 6 and 20 percent p.a. (Lawrance, 1991; Coller and 
Williams, 1999). On the other hand, OA may encourage the choice of occupations that 
yield a higher return to education due to increased risk (Anderberg, 2000). With regard to 
globalization, Poutvaara (2007) constructs a theoretical model with mobile workers who 
decide about their investment in education. He shows that if the home country offers flat-
rate OA benefits, then its workers invest more than in a closed economy because they 
hold the prospect of moving to the foreign country, where OA benefits increase with 
income.  
 8
Table 2. Predicted effects of social security’s benefits on educational effort 
 OA HI LCI 
Education (–) + (–) 
 
The benefits of LCI have two objectives. One is to prevent people from ending up in 
poverty for the last years of their life, the other, less prominent, to secure their 
bequeathable wealth. Concerning the first objective, LCI has the same effect as a 
supplement to OA and should therefore tend to somewhat discourage educational effort. 
As to the second objective, bequeathable wealth mainly stems from labor income earned 
over the life cycle. Protection of this wealth adds to its utility and hence should encourage 
educational effort as a means to create it. However, the predicted impact of LCI is 
minimal because final wealth will be positive only with a relatively low probability and 
because there must be relatives and friends worthy of the bequest. Finally, not only are 
these effects reduced by the respective probability weightings but also by discounting to 
present value (see Table 2). Not surprisingly, it has proved impossible to find supporting 
empirical evidence.  
Conclusion 1: The financing of the three branches of social security analyzed has a 
negative predicted overall impact on educational effort beyond the legal 
minimum. The ambiguous (OA, LCI) or countervailing (HI) influences of 
benefits are deemed to be too weak to counterbalance the clearly negative 
ones of contributions. 
The macroeconomic importance of this conclusion is evident. If social security should 
end up discouraging educational effort, it jeopardizes the future competitiveness of a 
country. With wage rates and employment increasing at a slower pace, this in turn creates 
problems for the financing of social security. This feedback effect constitutes a first 
indication that assuming economic growth to be exogenous to social security, as is usual 
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for predicting its financial status, is deficient in that this disregards the effect social 
insurance itself may have on growth (see e.g. Echevarria and Iza, 2006). 
3. MARRIAGE AND SOCIAL INSURANCE  
3.1. Financing of social security and marriage 
Often marriage provides the opportunity for one of the two partners to withdraw from the 
labor market. This decision is the more likely the smaller the concomitant loss of labor 
income. Since disposable labor income is reduced by social security contributions, 
nonmarket work becomes more attractive. In most countries, claims to HI and LCI are 
not affected as long as the working partner continues to pay contributions, while OA 
benefits are reduced to married couples in most OECD countries to reflect cost saving 
achieved by jointly living (Table 3 lists the effects). To the extent that mainly the less 
qualified worker shifts his or her activity into the household, increasing openness of the 
economy should reinforce this effect. The reason for this is the fact that globalization puts 
pressure especially on the wage rates of less qualified workers, thus reducing the 
opportunity cost of withdrawal (most likely women who on average continue to earn a 
lower wage rate than their male partners, cf. Disney and Whitehouse, 2002). 
Table 3. Predicted effects of social security’s financing on marriage 
 OA HI LCI 
Marriage (+) + + 
 
Unfortunately, there does not seem to be empirical evidence regarding these predictions. 
The closest analogy is income taxation, which also serves to reduce disposable income 
(without however giving rise to future claims). The effects of taxation on marriage have 
been the subjects of empirical research. For example, Alm and Whittington (1997) find 
that the changing tax burden associated with marriage has an effect on the timing of 
marriage. 
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3.2. Social security benefits and marriage 
Two persons living together in one household benefit from the advantage of risk 
diversification. Specifically, a minor health loss incurred by one partner can be taken care 
of by the other without having recourse to medical services. However, HI makes this 
advantage less decisive by facilitating access to formal medical services. HI could 
therefore cause marriage contracts not to be concluded or concluded later in life. 
However, in some countries (such as Germany), HI covers nonactive family members as 
well without a surcharge. In these countries, this constitutes an advantage that may 
neutralize or even overcompensate the negative impact HI otherwise would have on 
marriage. 
Similar arguments can be made with regard to OA. In some countries, married women 
are also covered without an additional contribution. This feature of OA benefits 
constitutes a definite incentive favoring marriage. Once more however, benefits are far in 
the future, causing them to be discounted to present value and reducing their impact. 
Table 4. Predicted effects of social security’s benefits on marriage 
 OA HI LCI 
Marriage (+) 
[0 also possible] 
– 
[(+) also possible] 
– 
 
With regard to LCI, the notable fact is that the married spouse provides the major part of 
long-term care (Schneekloth and Potthoff, 1993). With LCI, these informal services tend 
to be substituted by formal ones provided in homes and by professional service providers. 
Thus, LCI serve to somewhat undermine the motivation for marriage (its effects again 
occurring far in the future). Some preliminary evidence refers to the United States and a 
proposal to extend Medicaid to cover families with two rather than one parent present 
(Yelowitz, 1998). Moreover, teenage marriages and pregnancies out of wedlock are 
found to be more frequent when public support (such as Aid for Mothers with Dependent 
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Children, AFDC) is substantial in comparison to obtainable labor income (Bernstam and 
Swan, 1986). These benefits would be lost if parents were to marry or live jointly in a 
household. Table 4 shows the considered effects of social insurance benefits on marriage. 
An opening of the economy probably would not have an additional impact, and there are 
no empirical studies investigating these additional effects. 
Conclusion 2: The financing side of social insurance creates incentives in favor of 
marriage, while the benefits have mixed predicted effects. OA benefits 
favor married couples, while HI and LCI tend to have weak negative 
effects on marriage. 
On the whole, social security may have an impact on the civilian status of a population. 
This impact likely has limited influence on economic development, with the exception of 
an increase of the aggregate cost of health care because of a further growth of the number 
of single-person households, who have to rely to a greater extent on the benefits of HI 
and LCI than married individuals [Zweifel and Breyer (1997), ch. 11.2]. 
4. NUMBER OF CHILDREN AND SOCIAL INSURANCE 
4.1. Financing of social security and number of children 
Additional contributions to be paid to social security (HI, OA, and LCI) reduce 
disposable income over a major part of the life cycle. One possibility of neutralizing this 
reduction is to keep the number of children low or to refrain from having children. A 
negative relationship between social insurance and the number of children (who 
originally were a source of security in the family) has been theoretically argued by 
Felderer (1992). Empirical evidence has been provided by Cigno and Rosati (1996), 
showing that in England, Germany, Italy and the United States expansions of OA 
coverage were linked to a reduction in birth rates. However, other branches of social 
insurance not considered here might encourage having children. For example, German 
unemployment insurance, the replacement rate increases from 65 to 75% of the previous 
wage when there are children (Hujer and Schneider, 1989). Table 5 summarizes the 
effects of financing on children.  
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Table 5. Predicted effects of social security’s financing on the number of children 
 OA HI LCI 
Children – – – 
 
Economic openness is predicted to reinforce this negative relationship because children 
constitute an impediment to mobility, making it more costly for parents to migrate in an 
attempt to avoid an unfavorable benefit-contribution ratio of social insurance. However, 
there do not seem to exist empirical studies concerning such a reinforcement effect.  
4.2.  Social security benefits and number of children 
Again, the different branches of social insurance need to be distinguished. In principle, 
children increase the risk of incurring medical expenditures. By covering this cost to a 
great extent, HI mitigates this risk, thus encouraging larger families.  
With regard to OA, there is potential substitution between support provided by children 
to their retired parents and the benefits of OA. An expansion of OA quite likely causes a 
reduction of support provided by children (Table 6). The evidence comes mainly from 
developing countries where children still importantly contribute to the livelihood of their 
parents (Lillard and Willis, 1997; Swidler, 1986). More recently, Ehrlich and Kim (2007) 
have analyzed a panel of 57 countries covering 33 years. They find that birth rates are 
negatively related to OA benefits, holding constant the gender ratio, net growth of 
marriages, female labor force participation, and the gender ratio of educational attainment 
among others.  
While marriage partners provide most informal long-term care, children (especially 
daughters) are an important source as well. To the extent that social insurance provides 
financial support for formal services, substitution again is likely to be triggered, causing 
children to curtail their provision of services. However, this effect usually lies far in the 
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future at the time of marriage, and the likelihood of LTC is still low [although increasing, 
see Strüwe (1996), Schmähl and Rothgang (1996)], causing them to be second-order. 
Table 6. Predicted effects of social security’s benefits on the number of children 
 OA HI LCI 
Children (–) + (–) 
 
With migration between open economies children who live abroad have reduced value to 
potential parents. Indeed, Schrieder and Knerr (2000) find evidence suggesting that once 
children have left their native community in Cameroon, the amount of money remitted to 
their parents is low unless they stand to receive a bequest. This means that parents’ 
efforts at influencing or even controlling children’s behavior become costly and often 
ineffective. This is even more true when children know that thanks to OA and LCI there 
is no threat of their parents’ spending their last years of life in poverty. Moreover, LCI 
helps securing their inheritance at any rate. Given these difficulties, the incentive to have 
children at all is weakened even more (Lindbeck, Nibergh and Weibull, 1999). 
Conclusion 3:  Both contributions and benefits of social insurance are likely to cause a 
substitution of children by social security benefits, thus reducing 
population growth. 
5. DIVORCE AND SOCIAL  INSURANCE 
As a rule, the effects of social insurance on divorce should be the mirror image of those 
on marriage.  
5.1. Financing of social security and divorce 
When considering dissolving the marriage, the partner concerned frequently must take 
into account that she will have to return to work. The more contributions to social 
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insurance reduce disposable income from work, the less attractive this alternative 
becomes. This implies that the financing side of social insurance may stabilize marriage 
[an effect which may be viewed critically, see e.g. Estes (2004)]. Table 7 summarizes the 
effects.  
Table 7. Predicted effects of social security’s financing on divorce 
 OA HI LCI 
Divorce – – – 
 
5.2. Social security benefits and divorce 
Having HI makes it easier for singles to cope with sickness because HI enables them to 
rely on formal medical care with little if any out-of-pocket payment. As to OA, pensions 
of married couples usually fall short of the double of the pension of a single person in 
most industrial countries, reflecting the cost savings achievable by jointly living in a 
household (Disney and Johnson, 2001). The closer the equivalence of differences in 
pensions and costs of living, the more OA benefits are neutral with regard to divorce. It is 
the LCI benefit that lowers the cost of divorce. Since singles rely less on unpaid long-
term care services provided by the marriage. Thus, this serves to reinforce the effects of 
HI, which has already been found to facilitate singly living (see Table 8). 
Table 8. Predicted effects of social security’s benefits on divorce 
 OA HI LCI 
Divorce (–) + + 
 
Studies relate the increase in the number of single older women since 1950 in the United 
States to the expansion of OA benefits (Costa, 1999). This result probably has little to do 
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with the openness of the economy (as in the case of the marriage decision, see the 
pertinent section above). 
Conclusion 4: While contributions to social insurance create an incentive to avoid 
divorce, its benefits work in favor of divorce. The effects of the latter 
presumably outweigh the former. 
However, an increase of the divorce rate induced by social insurance should not have 
much of an impact on the economy because it also causes the rate of labor participation to 
increase. In fact, one-third of the increase of female participation rates in the United 
States during 1960 to 1980 can be explained by the increase of divorce rates; moreover, 
women in marriages at risk work more hours than do others (Johnson and Skinner, 1986). 
This increase of labor supply could even enhance growth at the macroeconomic level, 
giving rise to a positive feedback on the financing of social insurance. On the other hand, 
singles are more likely to claim benefits especially of HI and LCI (Klein, 1996), so the 
overall impact of this feedback may well be unfavorable. In other words, since the so-
called biological rate of return of pay-as-you-go social security importantly depends on 
the rate of growth of the active population (Aaron, 1996), its effect on divorce tends to 
jeopardize the financial equilibrium of social insurance in the long run. 
6. RETIREMENT AND SOCIAL INSURANCE  
6.1. Financing of social security and retirement  
An important motive for deferring retirement is the prospect of earning extra labor 
income. However, to the extent that contributions to social insurance do not create well-
defined individual claims (HI, LCI), they make deferral less attractive while encouraging 
earlier retirement. In the case of OA, additional contributions usually do found claims to 
future benefits. Where this is not the case, workers tend to retire early (Boldrin et al., 
1997). This makes the expected impact of OA benefits on labor supply ambiguous (for 
the role of future claims in the context of unemployment insurance, see Atkinson and 
Micklewright, 1991), however, their expansion on the whole seems to have contributed to 
earlier retirement (Viebrok, 1997). Table 9 summarizes the effects.  
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Table 9. Predicted effects of social security’s financing on retirement 
 OA HI LCI 
Early Retirement 0 
[+ also possible] 
+ + 
 
In the context of globalization, this effect is but reinforced because the portability of 
benefits increases the choice of locations for life in retirement. Being very recent, these 
tendencies have not yet been empirically studied. 
6.2. Social security benefits and retirement  
With regard to HI, the following effect is to be expected theoretically. Since utilization of 
medical care entails minimum out-of-pocket expense, other impediments become 
decisive.  These impediments are the opportunity costs associated with travel and waiting 
time. Their importance has been documented e.g. by Leu and Doppmann (1986, cited in 
Zweifel and Breyer, 1997, ch. 4.4). In retirement, these time costs lose relevance. By 
retiring, individuals benefit from lower opportunity costs. Conversely, an expansion of HI 
arguably encourages earlier retirement (Table 10), which permits the insured to have 
unfettered access to medical care. 
The connection with OA is more direct as OA benefits serve to mitigate the loss of 
income that would go along with retirement. Moreover, early retirement almost without 
exception does not entail an actuarially fair reduction of benefits. This of course cannot 
but increase the incentive to retire from active life. In the case of Germany, Börsch-Supan 
and Schnabel (1997) as well as Siddiqui (1997) were able to show the expected effect; for 
the case of Switzerland, see Baldenweg-Bölle (1998, ch. 7); for the Netherlands, see 
Heyma (2004); for the U.S., see Burtless (1986). 
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Table 10. Predicted effects of social security’s benefits on retirement 
 OA HI LCI 
Early Retirement + + – 
 
Migration as part of increased openness presumably reinforces these effects in two ways. 
First, by spending time abroad, workers get to know different legal systems and lifestyles, 
which serves to widen their choice of locations for retirement. And among those 
additional locations, there may be one that makes early retirement particularly attractive. 
Second, provided the elderly are successful in having contribution rates increased rather 
than their pensions curtailed, high-wage earners are predicted to go elsewhere (Leers et 
al., 2003). 
This train of thought also establishes a connection with educational effort (see above). 
Increasingly, this effort does not occur in schools but during professional activity. The 
earlier expected retirement, the shorter the payback period to educational investment, and 
the less therefore the incentive to invest. This is the conclusion reached by Jensen et al. 
(2004), who then compare retirement benefits to old-age benefits (which are paid 
regardless of employment status), with old-age benefits clearly inducing longer learning. 
However, there does not seem to be empirical evidence relating to a reduction of 
continued training caused by earlier retirement.  
Turning to LCI, the need for long-term care usually occurs at a time when the child 
(usually the daughter) is approaching retirement herself. With less LCI coverage, many 
daughters presumably would choose retirement in order to have time for providing 
support to their parents. With ample LCI coverage, they tend to continue work. 
Supporting empirical evidence has been found for the United States by Ettner (1995) as 
well as Wolf and Soldo (1994). Therefore, LCI may work against a tendency to quit the 
work force. However, this effect is limited to those still rare cases where at least one elder 
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in fact becomes a long-term care patient. Therefore, on the whole the likely effect of 
social insurance is to encourage early retirement.  
Conclusion 5: The financing of social insurance makes early retirement attractive. The 
benefits of health insurance (HI) and old age provision (OA) have the 
same effect, whereas long-term care insurance (LCI) may weakly 
encourage deferred retirement. On the whole, the three branches of social 
insurance analyzed tend to reduce labor supply at higher ages. 
As noted already in the context of Conclusion 1, this constitutes another instance where 
the impact of social security on aggregate labor supply and hence income likely is 
unfavorable, creating the potential for negative feedback that on the long run may drive 
social insurance schemes into deficit. 
7. LIFE EXPECTANCY AND SOCIAL INSURANCE  
7.1. Financing of social security and life expectancy 
Admittedly individuals cannot choose their time of death. However, they certainly can 
undertake efforts that influence their remaining life expectancy by investing in prevention 
and medical care. In each individual case, early death may occur in spite of these efforts; 
however, at the level of entire populations, such effects are discernible [Frech and Miller 
(2001), Zweifel et al. (2005)]. Therefore, the argument proceeds as though everyone had 
influence on his or her time of death. 
Table 11. Predicted effects of social security’s financing on life expectancy 
 OA HI LCI 
Life Expectancy 0 0 0 
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Since most individuals nowadays live to retirement, contributions to OA are a fixed cost 
once they are retired. As such, they do not have any relevance for efforts to increase life 
expectancy. As to the financing of HI and LCI, contributions do not increase with age (in 
spite of a growing risk that would call for an adjustment if they were risk-based as in 
commercial insurance). However, even private insurers fail to fully adjust HI premiums 
to this risk (Herring and Pauly, 2001). This fact implies that as far as HI and LCI are 
concerned, the marginal cost of living another year is a constant; the financing side of 
social insurance thus is predicted to have no influence on efforts to increase remaining 
life expectancy (see Table 11), and there is no empirical evidence for such an influence. 
7.2. Social security benefits and remaining life expectancy 
Since OA benefits are paid as a regular income rather than a lump sum capital, longer life 
does not entail a reduced quality of life (due to fewer resources available per period). The 
contrast can be seen by comparing OA with a private life policy that pays a capital to 
survivors at a specified age. If beneficiaries had to live off this capital for the remainder 
of their lives, they would be constrained to spend less per period to balance an increase in 
longevity, causing a decrease in the quality of life. Longer remaining life expectancy 
would thus entail a financial sanction that is absent from current OA systems. 
Figure 1 illustrates the argument. The curve RR’ symbolizes the boundary of attainable 
combinations of remaining life expectancy and quality of remaining life years 
(determined at least in part by income per year) if a private insurer paid out a capital at 
age 60 (say). It indicates that more life years can only be had at the cost of a sacrifice in 
terms of quality of life. By way of contrast, the boundary QQ’ symbolizes a typical public 
OA system, which guarantees an annual pension regardless of the number of years lived. 
As a matter of fact, the beneficiary needs to live another year to receive the OA benefit. 
On the other hand, preferences are represented by indifference curves that show a certain 
level of expected utility (EU). What figure 1 shows is that while the individual seems to 
be indifferent between RR’ and QQ’ at point S*, in fact he or she would opt for S** on 
QQ’ if given a choice, since EU1 > EU0. However, this choice goes along with a higher 
life expectancy R** (compared to that pertaining to point S*) and a lower quality of life. 
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Also note that a transition to a point like S’ (associated with reduced remaining life 
expectancy) is excluded if S* was an initial optimum. Thus, the prediction is that current 
public pension systems encourage people to strive for a long life. 
Figure 1. The predicted effects of a fixed-income vs. a lump-sum pension system  
 
 
 
 
 
As to HI, it has the property of decreasing the price of medical care at the time of 
utilization, including those that serve to increase life expectancy. In the same vein, LCI 
subsidizes services that improve the quality of life, usually when time of death is near. 
The majority of beneficiaries have financial reserves that would last only for a short stay 
in a nursing home. Without LCI coverage, they would soon suffer a big reduction in 
quality of life that would undermine their interest in prolonging life. Therefore, the easing 
of the trade-off between longevity and quality of life noted in the case of OA is even 
more marked in the case of LCI. 
Table 12. Predicted effects of social security’s benefits on life expectancy 
 OA HI LCI 
Life Expectancy + + + 
RR‘: Boundary of feasible set if  
          lump-sum benefit 
QQ‘: Boundary if OA benefit 
S*: Point of equivalence 
S**: Preferred point under OA 
R’ Q’ 
R 
Quality of life = f(..., income/period) 
Q 
S* 
EU0 
EU1 
S** 
S‘ 
Q
R** 
Q** 
R 
 21
The prediction that current OA systems increase remaining life expectancy was tested by 
Philipson and Becker (1998). Using information about retired employees of U.S. 
government, they distinguished groups according to their claims to future benefits. The 
group with the lowest expected benefits, amounting to less than US$ 1,000 a year, had 40 
percent survivors at the age of 80 whereas the group with the highest, 63 percent. Clearly, 
it is inappropriate to attribute the entire difference to the incentives that emanate from the 
prospect of a higher OA benefit. Federal employees of the top group, being more 
educated and earning higher incomes, presumably would have had a higher remaining life 
expectancy even without the incentive of the OA benefit. Finally, these effects have little 
to do if at all with the degree of openness of an economy, mainly because they do not 
depend on the choice of residence in the country or abroad. Conclusion 6 summarizes 
Tables 11 and 12.  
Conclusion 6: Whereas contributions to social security (HI, OA, LCI) do not have an 
impact on longevity, clear incentives to prolong life emanate from 
benefits, which are conditioned on survival without exception. This 
effect is reinforced when the three branches of social security are 
considered in combination. 
Current institutional design not only of HI but also of the other branches of social security 
could therefore have at least some impact on the aging of population. Individuals profit 
considerably from not having to bear the risk of excessive remaining life expectancy. 
When deciding about contributions to social security, policy makers need to account for 
these effects lest they jeopardize the financial equilibrium of the system.  
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS  
In this contribution, demographic change was not viewed as predetermined but 
endogenous, i.e. the consequence of individual decisions over the life cycle. The three 
branches of social security considered (health insurance HI, old age provision OA, and 
long-term care insurance LCI) have been found to influence individual decisions at 
several stages of the life cycle. The findings of this paper are summarized in table 13. The 
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entries show that in the majority of cases, decisions are modified in a way as to lower 
labor supply and hence long-run economic growth, resulting in a reduction rather than 
increase of future contributions to social security. While many of the theoretically 
predicted impacts have not been systematically tested to this date, there is at least 
preliminary evidence supporting some of them. However, this evidence is not firm 
enough to permit estimation of a net effect where social security contributions and 
benefits have opposing impacts, e.g. divorce. 
Table 13. Overview of theoretically predicted effects on life-cycle decisions 
 
Clearly, the relationships expounded here are important also for private insurance. 
However, private insurance differs from social security in three aspects. First, private 
insurers make less favorable risks pay higher premiums, thus providing them with an 
incentive to improve their risk profile. Second, private insurers are very much aware of 
moral hazard, i.e. the changes in behavior induced by the very conclusion of an insurance 
contract. For example, many of them write policies in HI with cost sharing or with 
limited choice of physicians and hospitals (managed care options) in order to limit moral 
Effects of OA, HI, LCI  
Decision Contributions 
Theory        Evidence
Benefits 
Theory      Evidence
Globalization 
Theory     Evidence 
Educational effort
Marriage 
Children 
 
Divorce 
Retirement 
Life expectancy 
– on wage n.a. 
– on LS (9) 
+ on LS  
– on future LS   9
– on LS n.a. 
– on LS (9) 
0 on LS, 0 on RLE 
  (9) 
+/– on wage  
+/– on LS (9) 
(+) on LS (9) 
 
+ on LS (9) 
– on LS  9 
0 on LS, + on RLE
  (9) 
reinforcing n.a. 
none  n.a. 
reinforcing n.a. 
 
none  n.a. 
reinforcing n.a. 
none  n.a. 
Note: LS = labor supply, RLE = remaining life expectancy, (9) = (some) confirming 
evidence, n.a. = not available 
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hazard effects. Third, the contracts written by private insurers do not have (at least under 
conditions of competition) the degree of homogeneity that characterizes social security, 
where homogeneity even is an objective in itself. Therefore, their incentive effects are not 
as bundled and unidirectional as those emanating from social security. 
An important finding is that globalization, i.e. the transition to more open economies, 
tends to exacerbate the negative feedbacks an expansion of social security may have on 
economic growth. Systems run into problems sooner mainly because some of those who 
can benefit from increased mobility seek to avoid the financial burdens imposed on them 
by social insurance. In sum, the life-cycle effects of social security in open economies 
serve to constrain policy makers in their pursuit of the redistributional goals they have 
traditionally been seeking to attain. 
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